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Opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena oli kartoittaa kyberturvallisuuden tilaa merenkulussa. 
Päätavoitteena oli selvittää, millaisia tietoverkkoja aluksissa käytetään ja kuinka 
turvallisia ne ovat. Toisena tavoitteena oli selvittää suomalaisen päällystön 
tietoteknisen osaamisen taso sekä heidän ymmärryksensä tietoturvasta. 
 
Työssä esitellään merenkulun tietotekniikkaan liittyvää lainsäädäntöä sekä ohjeistusta 
niin IMO:lta kuin luokituslaitoksilta. Lisäksi käydään läpi eri navigointilaitteiden 
haavoittuvuuksia erilaisten ulkoisten uhkien osalta ja esitellään laivalla olevien 
tietokoneiden vaikutusta laivan sisäverkon turvallisuuteen.  Työssä esitellään 
merenkulkijoiden tietoteknisen koulutuksen tasoa suomalaisissa 
ammattikorkeakouluissa. Lisäksi käydään läpi, miten nykyiset vakuutukset kattavat 
aluksen tietoturvavahingot, miten automaatio on vaikuttanut järjestelmien 
turvallisuuteen sekä miten merenkulku tulee kehittymään tulevaisuudessa ja miten 
näihin muutoksiin tulisi varautua tietoturvan osalta. Työssä perehdytään myös erilaisiin 
hyökkäyskeinoihin. 
 
Työssä tutkittiin kahden suomalaisen laivan tietoverkon rakennetta. Opinnäytetyössä 
esitellään, miten eri laitteet on kytketty verkkoon ja mitä toimenpiteitä on tehty 
kyberturvallisuuden parantamiseksi. Työssä esitellään myös mahdollinen 
hyökkäysskenaario toisen laivan verkkoon. Suomalaisen päällystön osaamista tutkittiin 
26 kysymyksestä koostuvalla kyselyllä, johon vastasi yhteensä 17 henkilöä. Kyselyn 
analysointi jaettiin kolmeen osa-alueeseen: taustat, IT-osaaminen ja 
kyberturvallisuustietoisuus. 
 
Tutkimus jäi osittain vajaaksi, sillä tutkittujen alusten kytkinten ja palomuurien 
konfigurointia ei päästy tarkastelemaan. Aihe vaatisi lisäselvitystä. Yleisellä tasolla 
laivojen verkoilla on potentiaalia olla turvallisia, mutta kehitettävää on. Päällystön 
osaaminen ylitti alkuperäiset odotukset monin osin, mutta vakaviakin puutteita 
löydettiin. Tulevaisuudessa olisi järkevää ottaa kyberturvallisuuskoulutus osaksi 
merenkulkijoiden osaamista. Lisäksi esitellään konsepti IT-perämiehestä: mitä hänen 
koulutukseensa, osaamiseensa ja vastuihinsa kuuluisi. 
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The purpose of this thesis was to find out the state of cybersecurity in shipping.  
The main objective was to study what sort of networks are used onboard vessels and 
how secure they are. The second objective was to study Finnish officers’ IT skills and 
security awareness. 
 
Maritime IT legislation and guidelines from the IMO and classification societies are 
presented in this thesis. The vulnerabilities of various navigation devices are listed.  
The effect of onboard computers on vessel’s network are presented. IT education of 
seafarers in Finnish universities was investigated. The insurance coverages concerning 
cyberattacks, effect of automation on system security and the future development of 
maritime sector on cybersecurity were studied. Theory of both remote side and client 
side cyberthreats was researched. 
 
Network structures of two Finnish vessels were investigated for this thesis. The 
different devices in the network and IT practices of vessels are presented. A possible 
attack scenario against the first vessel’s network is described. Finnish officers’ IT skills 
were studied using a survey consisting of 26 questions. There was a total of 17 
answers. The results were analysed in three categories: backgrounds, IT skills and 
security awareness. 
 
This thesis is partially incomplete as it was not possible to study the configurations of 
the vessels’ switches and firewalls. This subject should be studied further in the future.  
In general, the existing networks have potential to be secure but there is still room for 
improvement. The IT skills of the officers were better than initially expected but there 
were also some serious deficiencies. Training seafarers on cybersecurity should be 
made essential in the future. In addition, a concept of IT officer was considered in 
terms of education, skills and responsibilities. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS 
Active Directory A service that authenticates and authorizes all users 
and computers in a Windows domain type network, 
assigning and enforcing security policies for all 
computers and installing or updating software.  
AIS Automatic Identification System. It is designed to be 
capable of providing information about the ship to 
other ships and to coastal authorities automatically 
via VHF radio frequency. 
AMOS A maintenance software commonly used on board. 
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. A service that 
distributes network configuration parameters to 
domain computers. 
Domain A group of computers that function and are 
administered as a unit and are identified by sharing 
the same domain name on the the internet. 
ECDIS Electronic Chart and Display Information System. 
Electrical aid to navigation which complies with IMO 
regulations. 
IMO International Maritime Organization. A specialized 
organization of the United Nations regulating 
shipping. 
Man-in-the-middle A method where the attacker secretly relays and 
possibly alters the communication between two 
parties who believe they are directly communicating 
with each other. 
ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. An 
amendment of SOLAS which states the minimum 
security arrangements for ports and ships. 
 
 
Port A software based construct that identifies certain type 
of traffic. For example, port number 80 is used by 
web browsers. 
SMS Safety Management System. An organized system 
planned and implemented by the shipping companies 
to ensure safety of the ship and marine environment. 
It details all the important policies, practices, and 
procedures that are to be followed to ensure safe 
functioning of ships at the sea. 
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea. A convention that regulates 
minimum safety standards in construction, equipment 
and operation of vessels. 
STCW Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers. A code that sets 
qualification standards for maritime personnel. 
UKHO United Kingdom Hydrographic Office. An institute that 
collects hydrographic geospatial data to protect lives 
at sea. 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network. A VLAN might comprise a 
subset of the ports on a single switch or subsets of 
ports on multiple switches. By default, systems on 
one VLAN do not see the traffic associated with 
systems on other VLANs on the same network. 
VPN Virtual Private Network. A secure connection that 
extends private network over the internet.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Overall, technology has developed at an astonishing speed during last 
decades. However, shipping as an industry has always been a little slow as 
every invention or device needs to be approved by the IMO and the 
classification societies. A good example of maritime sector’s slowness is the 
implementation of the ISPS code. It received its start from the 9/11 attacks 
after which the US officials demanded improvement for security on ships and 
at ports. The code came into force in July 2004. It took almost three years to 
create and implement a new code and this was the fastest implementation in 
IMO’s history. 
This slowness to react can be understood when one starts to think about 
digitalization on board. Only now ECDIS is becoming mandatory for all 
vessels even though it was approved for navigation in November 1995. 
However, it is not all bad as more and more material is being transformed into 
digital format. Good example of this are the navigation manuals such as List of 
Radio Signals and List of Lights. However, there is a down side: it is not 
possible to access these files should a blackout occur since the computers are 
not usually behind an uninterruptible power source. 
The importance of cybersecurity has always been acknowledged but in recent 
years it has risen to a whole new level. Yet it is rather easy to neglect 
cybersecurity even with small actions. Integrity and security of systems is 
particularly important for vessel as there are vast amounts of money involved. 
This thesis includes a theoretical part where vulnerabilities of different 
onboard navigational devices will be explained. The current security situation 
and visions for the future will be discussed. Different cyberthreats are 
explained on a more technical basis. 
One could roughly separate maritime cybersecurity into two aspects: the 
structure and security of the vessel’s network and the human factor. These 
aspects will be studied in this thesis. The networks of two vessels were 
studied and evaluated. In addition, the vessels’ IT practises are discussed. 
The human factor was studied using a survey. The questions concerned deck 
and engine officers’ IT backgrounds, IT skills and security awareness.  
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The author of this thesis has a degree in Computer Sciences from a 
vocational college and experience working as an IT support. This gives the 
author proficient understanding for evaluating IT related topics.  
 
2 CYBERSECURITY IN SHIPPING 
2.1 Introduction to onboard cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity is rather large and complex concept and it is somewhat new in 
the field of shipping. Rules and regulations are an important part of maritime 
industry so we will take a look at the legislation concerning cybersecurity. 
Additionally, we study the weaknesses of electronic aids to navigation 
including ECDIS, AIS and GPS. Bridge integration and the effect of onboard 
computers on the network of a vessel will conclude this chapter. 
 
2.1.1 Legislation and guidelines 
The IMO published a new circular no. 1526 Interim Guidelines on Maritime 
Cyber Risk Management on June 2016. The document states that cyber 
threats are real and something should be done to prevent them (IMO 2016, 1). 
However, there are no mention about concrete actions how to achieve this.  
It is only mentioned that there should be distinction between information 
technology and operational technology system (IMO 2016, 2).  
My interpretation of this is that, for example, loading computers should be 
completely separated from the internet. All in all, the document is full of empty 
phrases and what makes it even worse is that it is only recommendable and 
not mandatory. With this the IMO shifts the responsibility from themselves to 
shipping companies and IT systems’ suppliers.  
It is disappointing that this is what they came up with. Computers have been 
essential tools on board for years now and the IMO is still incapable to deliver 
proper guidelines for cybersecurity. It must be admitted that vessels are 
diverse and it might be difficult to give instructions that could be easily applied 
to all vessels.  
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Shipping companies should have procedures and guidelines regarding 
cybersecurity. The latest edition of Bridge Procedures Guide (2016, 59) states 
the following: The exchange of electronic data between ships and shore 
authorities, service providers, charterers and owners/operators has increased 
significantly over recent years. The use of electronic data exchange, including 
updates to navigational systems and software, exposes users to the possibility 
of unauthorized or malicious access. This creates a risk to the safety and 
security of shipboard systems. 
To protect commercial interests, as well as to ensure that safety and 
environmental protection are not compromised, it is important that seafarers 
comply with Company cybersecurity procedures. Company procedures should 
consider industry guidelines as well as any regulatory requirements 
addressing cybersecurity. 
This is terribly vague description of cybersecurity and it gives no 
recommendations to the companies. This is peculiar as Bridge Procedures 
Guide usually gives very specific guidelines, recommendations and even 
ready checklists. The previous edition from 2007 did not even mention 
cybersecurity. This shows that maritime industry hasn’t been able to adopt to 
potential threats of technology it has already adapted. 
From my personal experience, some companies have mentioned 
cybersecurity in their Safety Management System, but once again, there have 
been only vague mentions about basics of cybersecurity and not any direct 
actions to be taken or guidelines. 
Classification societies have a large role on developing safe and secure ways 
of work. Lloyd’s Register has recognised the importance of cybersecurity and 
published guidelines on February 2016. This is a rather extensive document 
dealing with different areas of ICT including cyber security. It also recognises 
that cybersecurity related education should be given to all related crew 
members. (Lloyd’s Register 2016, 8) 
Ships do not usually have the luxury of 50+Mb broadband: many share a 
single 64Kb Inmarsat connection between a number of onboard systems. This 
means that in the event of attack or infection, any files required to rebuild or 
repair an onboard PC-based system must be on the ship already, rather than 
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having to be downloaded (something that could take a day using Inmarsat). 
Most vessels currently do not have operating system disks on board, let alone 
proprietary software, drivers or patches. This connectivity constraint also 
provides a single point of failure and vulnerability. These significant issues 
have to be addressed during the system’s design. (Lloyd’s Register 2016, 9) 
It is also acknowledged that ICT systems should not be acquired for the sake 
of technology but to serve crew in their tasks (Lloyd’s Register 2016, 5). The 
document gives guidelines for multiple fields of ICT but admits that giving 
prescriptive rules is not possible (Lloyd’s Register 2016, 10).  
 
2.1.2 ECDIS 
ECDIS has become an important aid for navigation. It is essential for all new 
vessels and it will become mandatory for existing vessels in July 2018. ECDIS 
is basically a Windows based computer with navigation software installed on 
it. The following table shows specifications of the hardware in Consilium’s 
system and they can be reviewed in full in Appendix 2. 
Table 1. Consilium ECDIS specifications 
Display 19” 1280x1024, 23” 1600x1200 or 27” 1920x1200 
Processor Intel Core 2 Duo 2,26 GHz 
RAM 2 Gb 800 MHz DDR2 
Graphics Card Intel 4500MHD Integrated 
Hard Disk 30 Gb SSD 
Operating system Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the computer running ECDIS is completely 
obsolete. In my experience, the computers are barely capable of running the 
ECDIS software. There are long waiting times when loading a new route. The 
worst part is that all systems that I have seen are running Windows XP. Tim 
Rains, Security Director from Microsoft, explains that the worst part is that 
Windows XP will basically have “zero day” vulnerability forever as it no longer 
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receives security updates (Rains 2013). One saving fact is that ECDIS is not 
usually connected to the internet and therefore cannot be infected remotely. 
The risk is when an officer installs updates to the system. This will be dealt 
more profoundly in chapters 3.1 and 3.2. 
Another aspect is that the computers running ECDIS are completely 
unprotected. There are no antivirus (AV) software installed on them. One 
reason is that the computers simply do not have enough computing power to 
run them beside the navigation software. The second point is that some AV 
software no longer support Windows XP.  
The NCC Group conducted a survey regarding ECDIS’s vulnerabilities. The 
test environment included an ECDIS demo from one of the major 
manufacturers ran on Windows 7 (32-bit) with basic configurations and no 
firewall or AV software were installed.  Firstly, they were able to browse, list 
and download any files stored on the computer. Secondly, they could upload, 
delete or replace any file on the ECDIS Windows 7 system. Other 
vulnerabilities were also found. (NCC Group 2014, 8) 
 
2.1.3 AIS 
AIS has been mandatory on all passenger vessels and international sea-going 
vessels with 300GT or more since 2002 (Balduzzi, Wilhoit & Pasta 2014, 3). It 
has made navigation safer especially in limited visibility conditions. However, 
AIS has no built-in security measures, making it vulnerable to external threats. 
It has been proved that it is possible to disable AIS communication, tamper 
with existing AIS data, trigger SAR alerts and spoof collisions (Balduzzi et al. 
2014, 3). However, all these threats can be avoided by comparing data to 
other sources such as radar and visual look-out. 
 
2.1.4 GPS 
GPS is an essential device for determining the ship’s position at open sea. 
The only alternative is astronomical navigation. GPS feeds position 
information for many navigational systems, allowing them to work properly. In 
2013, Todd Humphreys and his students from University of Texas conducted 
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a test to spoof ship’s GPS system. They were able to replace genuine GPS 
signals with fake signals sent by a 2000 $ spoofer causing navigation 
equipment to think that the ship is three degrees off course (Psiaki & 
Humphreys 2016). The worst part is that the GPS device cannot tell whether it 
is being spoofed or not.  
The same people behind the proof of concept worked on countermeasures. 
As genuine GPS signals come from various satellites in different directions, a 
spoofing signal will most likely come from a single source. They were able to 
use this fact in their defensive device, which could tell if the signal was 
spoofed with a six second delay. (Psiaki & Humphreys 2016) 
Earlier this year, GPS manufacturer U-blox released the first commercially 
available spoofing defence for consumer GPS receivers in a firmware update 
to its M8 line of navigation systems (Psiaki & Humphreys 2016).  
 
2.1.5 Integrated Bridge 
The first forms of bridge integration are from late 1960. As computers of that 
time were not that advanced, the interfacing between devices was done using 
analogue connections such as synchro transmitters and receivers, stepper 
transmitter and stepper receiver, pulses and analogue DC voltage. Today, 
navigation equipment is connected using serial cables in accordance with 
Marine Industry Standard Serial Data Communication IEC61162. This way all 
devices are compatible with each other. However, analogue information is still 
used for devices as propeller pitch or rudder angle indicators (HiMarine 2016, 
82). 
Some years ago, it was common practice to buy each navigation device 
separately. If one was not careful enough it was possible that two devices 
weren’t compatible with each other. Today’s bridges are more or less 
integrated which means that shipping company orders the bridge equipment 
from one manufacturer which provides all the devices and ensures 
compatibility. Example of Furuno’s integrated bridge can be seen in Figure 1. 
Acquiring the bridge equipment as a package from one manufacturer also 
clears up responsibility questions. 
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Figure 1 Furuno's integrated bridge (Furuno 
https://www.furuno.fi/fin/ulkomaanliikenne/navigointijarjestelmat/integroidut_komentosillat/) 
 
Radar, ECDIS and conning displays receive information from many input 
devices.  As mentioned earlier, this data is transferred using serial cables. 
There has been some development with the interface as some devices are 
connected using Ethernet cables.  
There has been talk that in the future all navigational devices could be 
connected to a single local area network. This would make cabling easier but 
there are some security issues. As ECDIS is connected to the internet it would 
indirectly connect the whole navigation network to the internet. This would 
lead to a need for security measures, for example, to prevent unauthorised 
access to gyro compass. There is always a possibility to gain access to 
devices connected using Ethernet cables. This possibility exists for serial 
cables too but it is far more unlikely to happen. 
 
2.1.6 Onboard computers 
Computers are used for various tasks on board vessels. The most important 
functions are calculating the vessel’s stability, monitoring sensor data, 
updating ECDIS and general information exchange with the company and 
shore-based officials. Some of the computers are connected to the internet 
continuously and this makes them vulnerable to cyber threats. Usually the 
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computers used for monitoring and controlling onboard machinery, such as 
the main engine, are not connect to the internet. When designed properly, the 
use of ICT can increase efficiency and safety through improved monitoring 
and communication, and greater situational awareness on the bridge, in the 
engine room and in other operational areas (Lloyd’s Register 2016, 2). 
One vulnerability is the crews’ email addresses. They are almost in every case 
formed in the following way: jobtitle.shipname@shippingcompany.com. This 
makes phishing attempts effortless as one can guess the email address with 
ease. As Panda Security proved in their study ‘Operation “Oil Tanker” The 
Phantom Menace’, all it takes to infect computer is to open a PDF file. The file 
then extracts itself to multiple files and begins to gather and send credential 
information to the attacker (Panda Security 2015, 4). The smartest part is that 
the malware uses legitimate tools making it invisible to AV software (Panda 
Security 2015, 6). 
Usually there are a few computers on board reserved for crew’s personal use. 
Since they are available for everyone, one should take extra care when using 
these computers. Who knows what someone else might have done with 
these. Special attention should be taken when using USB devices as it is 
possible to infect other machines this way. 
Once again, IMO’s guidelines are disappointing. There are not really any 
regulations for computers used on board. The only reference is IMO’s Circular 
MSC/Circ.891 Guidelines for the On-board Use and Application of Computers 
from 1998, which hasn’t stood the test of time. At that time, computers were 
beginning to come on board and this was the IMO’s response to clear things 
up. It might have been enough at the time, but it is not enough today. The 
problem is that the document is still valid since even the latest edition of 
SOLAS from 2014 still refers to this circular. Surprisingly in chapter 3.1.6 it is 
stated that Computer-based systems should be protected against 
unintentional or unauthorized modification of programs and data  
(IMO 1998, 3). However, means to achieve this are not presented nor are 
there any guidelines for this. 
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2.2 Situation at present and in future 
This chapter takes a more general view on the topic of maritime cybersecurity. 
The education of Finnish officers in Finnish universities of applied sciences 
will be studied as well as insurance coverages concerning cybersecurity 
incidents. The future of shipping is also pondered as automation develops and 
autonomous vessels may become possible. 
 
2.2.1 Education 
Education is an essential part of becoming a professional seafarer. IMO’s 
STCW code dictates what should be included in seafarers’ education. The 
latest amendments came into force in 2012. However, the word ‘cyber’ is not 
mentioned even once in the code. Only the electro-technical officer is required 
to understand the following: main features of data processing, construction 
and use of computer networks on ships, bridge-based, engine-room based 
and commercial computer use (STCW 2011, 172). To make matters worse, 
most ships do not even have an electro-technical officer. Usually there is an 
electrician on board but even that is not necessary. In the worst case, there is 
no one who has the understanding of the ship’s network. 
Deck officers are only required to know how to use computer based radio 
equipment and to fix possible software related problems (STCW 2011, 320). 
There is no mention of anything computer training even though computers 
have been an essential part of shipping for years. Technically, using 
computers is not part of safe navigation and watchkeeping, but they are 
important tools.  
Fortunately, things are little better here in South-Eastern Finland University of 
Applied Sciences. We have two IT related courses as part of our education. 
The first one is worth five credits and is focused on the use of Microsoft Office 
tools. The second one is worth three credits and is focused on the use of 
programs commonly used on board. Marine Engineers also have these 
courses. However, neither of these courses takes into account cybersecurity 
in any way.  
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IT studies have even lower priority in other Finnish maritime schools. In Novia 
University of Applied Sciences they have an IT course for Microsoft Office but 
it is only worth 1.5 credits. Even worse, Satakunta University of Applied 
Sciences has decided to make Microsoft Office part of its ‘Learning Skills’ 
course which includes also introduction to school’s practices and is only worth 
one credit. 
  
2.2.2 Insurances 
One interesting point is whether insurances cover damage caused by a 
possible cyberattack. Many insurance policies include a cyberattack Exclusion 
clause which states:  
 1.1 Subject only to Clause 1.2 below, in no case shall this insurance cover 
loss damage liability or expense directly caused by or contributed to by or 
arising from the use or operation, as a means for inflicting harm, of any 
computer, computer system, computer software program, malicious code, 
computer virus or process or any electronic system. 
1.2 Where this clause is endorsed on policies covering risks of war, civil war, 
revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or civil strife arising therefrom, or any hostile 
act by or against a belligerent power, or terrorism or any person acting from a 
political motive, Clause 1.1. Shall not operate to exclude losses (which would 
otherwise be covered) arising from the use of any computer, computer system 
computer software program, or any electronic system in the launch and/or 
guidance system and/or firing mechanism of any weapon or missile (Hellenic 
Shipping News 2016). 
Per these clauses insurance companies are not required to reimburse for 
damages of a cyberattack. The aim of this chapter was to raise a point and 
insurances will not be discussed further in this thesis. 
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2.2.3 Automation 
Change is coming and there are already solutions where fuel consumption 
data is sent to the company’s office via the internet. It is already possible to 
remotely access shipboard automation system. For example, if a ship is 
equipped with Wärtsilä’s Integrated Automation System, Wärtisilä’s service 
personnel can connect to the system via VPN connection and have the same 
view as the engineer on board. Wärtsilä says that even though it is possible to 
make corrections remotely, they will then guide the crew to make those 
corrections instead of making the changes themselves remotely (Wärtsilä 
2016). 
As discussed in chapter 2.1.5, the bridge of a modern vessel is integrated. 
This allows to automate navigational processes. For example, it is possible to 
set the autopilot to follow the route planned on ECDIS. This is rarely used 
practise on Finnish vessels as it takes control away from the officer of the 
watch. As the automation system tries to keep the vessel directly on the route 
line, it wears the rudder more than steering the vessel using autopilot’s 
heading mode. 
Another example of automation is a vessel equipped with dynamic position 
system. In this case the control of vessel’s propulsion system is given to 
computers that execute orders given by officer. This system relies heavily on 
accurate GPS data to keep vessel in place, making if rather vulnerable to 
spoofing described in chapter 2.1.4. 
 
2.2.4 Autonomous vessels 
Rolls-Royce is currently studying the possibility of having autonomous vessels 
replacing conventional vessels in the future. Their project AAWA (Advanced 
Autonomous Waterborne Applications Initiative) is funded by Tekes and they 
have co-operation with several Finnish universities. They are now studying 
technological, safety, legal and economic aspects of autonomous shipping. 
They claim to have a proof of concept by the end of 2017 and to have a 
remote controlled vessel in commercial use by end of 2020. In their vision, 
they will have an ocean-going autonomous vessel in 2035 (Rolls-Royce 2016, 
2). 
19 
 
Having a completely autonomous vessel requires large amounts of sensor 
inputs which must be processed by a computer system which understands the 
rules of the road at sea. In order to have a computer that makes all the 
navigational decisions while an operator is overseeing multiple vessels from a 
remote station may seem a little far-fetched now but the rapid development of 
computer technology may make this possible in the coming decades. 
Antti Äijälä lists a few problems on autonomous shipping in his bachelor’s 
thesis ‘The Risks of Operating an Autonomous Vessel’. One of these is data 
transmission. He says that at present there are no means of transmitting large 
amounts of data rapidly and effectively over vast distances (Äijälä 2015, 26). 
Communication will need to be bidirectional, accurate, scalable and supported 
by multiple systems – creating redundancy and minimising risk (Rolls-Royce 
2016, 3). Even though vessels would be completely autonomous, they will be 
accessible via the internet making cybersecurity even more important. 
Rolls-Royce acknowledges cyber risks and says that it would be possible to 
remotely take over the control of the vessel in malicious purposes. They also 
know the possibility of jamming or spoofing AIS or GPS that were handled in 
chapter 2.1. To minimize the risks Rolls-Royce suggests to eradicate the 
vulnerabilities of vessel’s computer systems and to add intrusion prevention 
and detection. Systems need to be updated on a regular basis and data needs 
to be encrypted and verified (Rolls-Royce 2016, 66). All in all, the same things 
that should be taken into account on conventional vessels. Even the human 
factor remains as the remote operator still has access to the vessel’s systems.  
 
3 CYBERTHREATS 
There are various cyberthreats in existence, a few of them are listed here. 
Many threats rely on the human element, as direct attacks are often blocked 
by proper use of firewalls and other security measures. 
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3.1 Social engineering 
As it is with every technical device, users are always the weakest link in the 
security chain. Their actions present a security hole that can never be 
completely plugged.  Secondly, attack from the inside creates the largest 
threat to overall security. The worst-case scenario is created when an inside 
attacker is unaware that he is one (Walker 2012, 194). 
Social engineering is the art of manipulating a person, or a group of people, 
into providing information or a service they otherwise would never have given. 
For example, most people would never give their password if asked directly. 
However, many would give just that if asked by someone seemingly 
trustworthy, such as help desk employee or network administrator. Social 
engineering can be divided into two categories: human-based and computer-
based (Walker 2012, 195). 
Human-based engineering uses interaction in conversation, email or other 
means between people in order to gather information. These means usually 
require physical access to target location which can be obtained by claiming 
that you forgot your ID badge home and ask an authorized person to let you 
in. Means to obtain information can be as simple as dumpster diving: going 
through discarded papers looking for passwords, employees contact info or 
information about a company’s network. One could also pretend to be a valid 
user, such as tech support person, and convince an employee to grant access 
to company’s computer. The attacker could also contact IT support claiming to 
be a user in that company and request password reset. An attacker could also 
look over the user’s shoulders, or from a long distance using binoculars, as 
they log in and therefore gain login credentials. Eavesdropping may also 
reveal valuable information. One devious method is known as reverse social 
engineering where the attacker manages the target to contact the attacker. 
This way the target trusts the attacker more compered to situation where the 
attacker would contact the target. For example, the attacker sends an email to 
a group of users warning them about “network issues tomorrow” and has 
provided a phone number for “help desk” if they are affected. The next day, 
the attacker performs a simple denial of service attack to target machine and 
waits for the user to call him. Then he simply asks for the user’s ID and 
password so the attacker could “solve the problem” (Walker 2012, 195-197).  
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Computer-based attacks are carried out by using a computer or other data-
processing device. These include specially crafted pop-up windows, tricking 
user to click through a fake website and false SMS texts. Social media can be 
used to gather information to make the false messages to seems more 
sophisticated and believable (Walker 2012, 198). 
 
3.2 Phishing and Spear phishing 
Phishing attack consists of crafting a seemingly legit email which contains 
links to fake website or to download malicious content. The email may appear 
to be from a bank, credit card company or other various legitimate business. 
Should the user click the links, the attacker gains all the information the user 
inputs to the fake website. These emails can be terribly deceiving and even  
a seasoned user can be tricked. The best way against phishing emails is to 
educate users how to recognise them. Here are a few examples of how to 
recognise fake email: 
 Unknown sender. Even if the email is seemingly from someone you know 
but the content seems to be out of place, it is still something to be cautious 
about. 
 
 Greeting. It should ring bells if the email is not specifically addressed to 
you but uses something general such as “Dear member”. 
 
 Phone number. If the email contains a phone number, you should check its 
validity before calling to it, preferably not at all. 
 
 Spelling and grammar mistakes. Emails from genuine businesses are 
always written using proper words and grammar. 
 
 Hyperlinks. Check the links before clicking them. Hovering mouse over the 
link reveals the actual website the link would take you to. 
 
Spear phishing is more advanced and dangerous version of phishing. Here 
the attacker has collected information about the victim using other means of 
social engineering. The basic idea is still the same: to send an email 
containing links to fake websites. However, this time the target is greeted 
using his or her name. The email contains legit information about the target 
making the target less suspicious (Palo Alto Networks 2016, 7). 
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Phishing is not always carried out using emails. Social media has become an 
important platform for phishing and methods such as a link on Facebook or on 
a message board or a shortened URL on Twitter are not that rare anymore. 
These methods allow the attacker to collect information about the target for 
spear phishing (Palo Alto Networks 2016, 7). 
 
3.3 Watering hole 
A watering hole attack is a security exploit in which the attacker seeks to 
compromise a specific group of end users by infecting websites that members 
of the group are known to visit. The goal is to infect a targeted user's computer 
and gain access to the network at the target's place of employment. Watering 
hole attacks, which tend to focus on legitimate, popular websites, are a 
derivative of pivot attacks, which target one thing to get at another. In a 
watering hole attack, the attacker first profiles its targets -- who are typically 
employees of large enterprises, human rights groups or government offices -- 
to determine the type of websites they frequent. The attacker then looks for 
vulnerabilities in the websites and injects malicious JavaScript or HTML code 
that redirects the target to a separate site where the malware is hosted. This 
compromised website is now ready to infect the target with the injected 
malware upon access. (TechTarget 2015). 
While watering hole attacks are uncommon, they pose a considerable threat 
since they are difficult to detect and typically target high-security organizations 
through their low-security employees, business partners, connected vendors 
or an unsecured wireless network. (TechTarget 2015). 
 
3.4 Malware 
In the past, malware was only a swarm of independent agents that only 
infected machines and replicated themselves, making detection rather easy. 
Modern malware can be difficult to notice, and according to Global Security 
Report, on average it takes 188 days from infection to detection. This is 
because malware is able to mutate or it can be updated to avoid detection by 
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traditional antimalware signatures. Malware can also be crafted specifically 
against certain individual or organization (Palo Alto Networks 2016, 14). 
Malware can also be delivered using a drive-by download. This way the user 
is unaware while the malware is downloaded by taking advantage of a 
vulnerability in an operating system, web browser or an application. Using a 
software exploit the malware can also trick an application, such as web 
browser, to run its code. Once a computer has been infected, malware 
ensures its survivability on that machine by various means, such as creating a 
backdoor, granting root-level access or even by disabling AV software. After 
that malware is ready to be used by the attacker to take control of the target or 
to gather information. However, this communication must be stealthy. This can 
be achieved by encrypting the communication, circulating the traffic or by 
using port hopping (Palo Alto Networks 2016, 16-18).  
Traditional firewalls use ports and protocols to identify and filter traffic. This 
will be ineffective against malware that hop from port to port until they find an 
open connection to the network (Palo Alto Networks 2016, 28).  
A next‐generation firewall performs a true classification of traffic based not 
simply on port and protocol, but on an ongoing process of application analysis, 
decryption, decoding, and heuristics. These capabilities progressively peel 
back the layers of a traffic stream to determine its true identity. The ability to 
pinpoint and analyze even unknown traffic — without regard to port or 
encryption — is the defining characteristic of a true next‐generation firewall 
and is invaluable in the fight against advanced malware, exploits, and other 
sophisticated threats (Palo Alto Networks 2016, 34). 
 
3.5 Denial of Service 
Once an endpoint has been infected malware, it becomes a bot which can be 
part of a larger botnet. These botnets are often used to overwhelm target 
server or network with enormous amounts of traffic. This is known as 
distributed denial of service (DDoS). Bots themselves are not the target, and 
often are unaware of the infection, but they are effective tools to be used (Palo 
Alto Networks 2016, 9). A few ways to reduce the risk of DoS is to disable 
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unnecessary services, using a good firewall policy and keeping software and 
hardware up to date (Walker 2012, 298).  
 
4 SHIPS’ NETWORK STRUCTURE AND IT PRACTICES 
The primary objective of this thesis was to investigate what sort of networks 
are installed on board and then evaluate whether there is room for 
improvement. I was able to study two different ship’s networks. It was agreed 
with the ships’ masters that ships, companies and possible third parties 
remain anonymous and from now on the vessels shall be referred as ship A 
and ship B. 
 
4.1 Ship A 
One could compare a ship’s network to a small company’s network. There are 
some small differences, such as the absence of a fixed the internet connection 
due to ships’ mobile nature. Ship A’s network structure can be seen in Figure 
2.   
 
Figure 2. Network structure of Ship A 
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The internet was provided via either 4G network or satellite connection. On 
this vessel, 4G connection was used only near Finland’s shoreline, as the use 
abroad would be expensive due to the amount of data. Therefore, the satellite 
connection is used primarily. Both the internet connections go through the 
ship’s firewalls to prevent unauthorized access.  
The nexus of ship A’s network is a switch which connects all the devices 
together. However, the ship’s network is part of the whole shipping company’s 
network. For example, the email server and some of the databases are 
physically located in the office ashore. The ship’s computers are connected 
through a VPN connection to the office.  
The server on board handles active directory, DHCP and backups. DHCP is 
configured in such way that only ship’s own computers static IP addresses are 
allowed. Even if one would plug in your own computer to the network, the 
server would not give access. The network is also configured to prioritize 
based on computer and traffic type. For example, the email traffic of master’s 
computer has one of the highest priorities while a leisure computer’s access to 
a news site is far down in the priority configuration.  
Backups are taken daily from crucial systems and saved in the server. In 
addition, senior officers have external hard drives for taking their own 
backups. 
All the computers on board had AV software installed on them. They also had 
remote connection software so that company’s own IT department can make 
connection if need be. 
One interesting fact was that the leisure computers are also connected to the 
company’s domain. It is understandable when considering how the network is 
designed to work. Access to some web sites is denied, for example adult 
entertainment sites. 
On ship A, the ECDIS is provided by Furuno. Their solution for updating 
ECDIS is to connect it to their own servers which can be seen in Figure 3. 
When UKHO publishes new chart updates, Furuno’s servers download them 
and send the files via satellite connection to ship’s Gate-1 unit. From there the 
26 
 
navigation officer installs updates to ECDIS. What is worrying is that ECDIS is 
connected to Gate-1 via Ethernet cable. Furuno says that the connection is 
authenticated by RSA keys and encrypted by AES (Furuno). Despite these 
security measures the fact that there is direct connection between ECDIS and 
the internet remains. This is particularly dangerous as ECDIS has no AV 
software and it is running on Windows XP. 
 
Figure 3. Furuno's ECDIS chart update system (Furuno 
http://www.furuno.com/en/merchant/ecdis/gate-1/) 
 
There were some general instructions and guidelines for cybersecurity in ship 
A’s Safety Management System. There were no dos and do nots. This was 
peculiar as some tasks are described in great detail in the SMS. 
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4.2 Ship B 
As can be seen from Figure 4, the network structure of ship B is rather similar 
with ship A with some minor differences.  
 
Figure 4. Network structure of Ship B 
 
The internet is accessed in the same way as in Ship A. However, on this 
vessel 4G connection was allowed abroad. Nowadays almost all ships are 
equipped with satellite connection as exchanging emails has become crucial 
part of shipping industry. That is where similarities end. 
Ship B is an independent unit and it is not connected to shipping company’s 
network. All the services are installed in the onboard server. In this case, each 
of the shipping company’s vessels had their own domain as the previous case 
each ship was part of the company’s domain. 
The switch is configured to have two VLANs: one for the ship’s own 
computers and the other for crew’s personal computers. The ship has 
workstations and leisure computers connected to the switch via Ethernet 
cable. They seemed to be in good condition as they were running Windows 7 
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and they had AV software installed. Then I discovered a laptop in the crew’s 
coffee room which was running Windows XP and had no AV software, 
therefore compromising the whole network. 
The IT support is outsourced to a third party which administers devices, 
network and provides support. Onboard computers had a remote-control 
software installed on them.  
The other VLAN was meant for the crew’s personal use. There were Wi-Fi 
repeaters on each deck. Due to the vessel’s solid structure, the repeaters 
have a limited range, and it is not possible to access the network from shore 
even when the ship is at berth. The network was protected with a WPA key 
but there was a problem: the password was written to each repeater, allowing 
possible unauthorized access. There was also another problem as the 
administrator passwords for the routers were written on a paper in the bridge. 
The saving grace is that unauthorized physical access to ship is rather difficult 
due to arranged security measures per the ISPS. The administrator 
passwords for the server and the switch were only known by the third party. 
Keeping ECDIS up to date was arranged in a different way than in ship A.  
In this case, ECDIS had no the internet connection. Updates were 
downloaded with bridge workstation and then transferred into a dedicated 
USB stick, which was then plugged to ECDIS. It was said in the company’s 
SMS that the stick must be scanned for viruses each time it is plugged in. 
Here ECDIS ran also on top of Windows XP, making it vulnerable to infections 
via the USB stick as there is no AV software installed. 
 
4.3 Attack scenario 
Let us think about a scenario how to take advantage of ship A’s network. The 
attacker starts by looking possible victims from LinkedIn. He finds Oscar 
Officer, a recent graduate from maritime school working as a junior officer 
onboard ship A. The attacker gathers information about Oscar from social 
media. Then a spear phishing email is crafted specifically targeted for Oscar.  
Few days later Oscar opens up his personal email account on the vessel’s 
computer and notices that he has been approached by a renowned cruise 
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ship company. He is greeted by name, complimented on his achievements 
and offered a position on their new vessel. All Oscar has to do is to simply fill 
in the attached contact form and send it back to them. Having delusions of 
grandeur about himself, Oscar has no second thoughts and opens the 
attached PDF file.  Unknown to him, the PDF has hidden piece of malware 
included that runs when the file is opened. The attacker has now access to 
this computer. 
The next step for attacker is the identify what sort of network he is facing. As 
he is aware that networks onboard vessels are not as secure as they should 
be and that it is unlikely that there is no IT person onboard, he starts to scan 
for open ports, operating systems and running applications. Now he may also 
start to listen the traffic for information, such as user accounts and passwords, 
using man-in-the-middle attack. At some point, he finds out that there is an 
ECDIS software running on top of Windows XP. He uses vulnerabilities of the 
operating system to access the computer. He then decides to have some “fun” 
and changes the location of few crucial navigation buoys as described in 
chapter 2.1.2.  
 
5 HUMAN FACTOR 
Despite all the advanced systems and devices we have, there is always a 
human operating them. This will eventually lead to a human error which can 
have severe consequences. Cybersecurity just as much a question of culture 
and attitude as it is technology. The best encryption algorithms in the world 
are useless if someone writes the password on a Post-it note and leaves the 
door open (Hansen & Rahman 2013, 1). Training the officers to use these 
tools efficiently and safely is the key for avoiding accidents. 
The second objective of this thesis is to study the competence of Finnish 
officers regarding their IT skills and the internet security awareness. I 
conducted a survey where each officer filled in an Excel sheet in my laptop 
containing 26 questions. The survey was conducted as structured interview as 
I had fixed question form (Hirsjärvi, Remes & Sajavaara 2008, 203). The 
survey can be found in Appendix 1. There were a total of 17 answers, nine 
from deck officers and eight from engine officers. The ages of the officers 
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varied between twenty and sixty years. This survey is not scientifically 
accurate but more of a directional sort as the number of answers is rather low.  
In hindsight, it would have been a good idea to have an external mouse since 
some people struggled using the laptop’s integrated mouse. Some questions 
could have used more refinement since some of the officers found them a little 
confusing and they had to ask what I meant with the question in hand. 
I tried to find some existing surveys which I could use as a base for my own 
survey but to my surprise I was unable to find one. There were a few that were 
somewhat near of what I wanted but not close enough to be used for this 
purpose. Therefore, I created the survey from scratch. I designed the 
questions to be simple and close to earth since my assumption was that 
officers do not have deep knowledge about computer technology. 
The purpose of this survey is to find out: 
1. How officers feel about their own IT skills? 
2. What kind of experience they have with computers? 
3. How aware they are about cybersecurity risks? 
 
5.1 Backgrounds 
The first six questions asked about officers’ backgrounds with computers and 
information technology in general. The survey began with a question asking 
officers to evaluate their own IT skills. This can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Results of IT skills evaluation 
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The results are twofold. It is good to notice that none of the officers considered 
their skills as poor. On the other hand, it is worrying that there is no one who 
feels their skills as excellent, especially as computer related duties are 
becoming more and more solid part of officers’ daily routines. 
Next the officers were asked if they have a degree in IT related subject and if 
they have been on IT courses. Results are as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Results of courses & education 
 
The person who answered to have a degree, specified later that he had 
started to study computer science in a university but dropped out during his 
first year of studies. The rest had no previous education on IT. It was 
comforting to find out that the majority of officers had taken some courses. On 
next question, they were asked to specify what courses they had taken and it 
was allowed to mention multiple courses. The results can be seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. List of taken IT courses 
 
The majority of the officers had taken some course regarding Microsoft Office, 
but some said that they counted the course provided by school during their 
maritime studies. The rest of the answers were divided. Two persons had 
taken a course about using Windows based operating system efficiently. It is a 
good choice since it makes their everyday life easier. Also, two persons had 
taken a course on AMOS. I have briefly used AMOS and I found it highly 
confusing as it seems a rather complex program but after taking an 
introduction course for AMOS everything became much easier to understand. 
Since using AMOS is a daily routine for engine officers and rather usual for 
deck officers, it would have been logical to assume that more people would 
have taken course on it. The rest of the answers are more difficult to analyse 
but they are interesting as there are also some advanced subjects as network 
technology and dynamic data. These are not essential in onboard duties but 
more on nice to know basis. 
When asked if they felt like they needed more training on some subject, seven 
persons answered yes. They were then asked to specify what subject they 
wished to learn better. It was allowed to give multiple answers. The results 
can be seen in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Results of I feel that I need more training in following subject(s) 
 
Microsoft Office was the most popular answer. It is good to find that the 
officers recognize themselves if they need more training as Microsoft Office 
programs are part of their daily routines. The same goes for AMOS. The rest 
of the answers are more distinct. One of the officers felt that he is not 
comfortable with recently installed Windows 10. One navigation officer 
answered that he needed training in new programs used to send the ship’s 
traffic information to the Finnish Transport Agency. 
 
5.2 IT skills 
In this chapter, we delve into officers’ IT skills. First, it was found out how they 
handle situations when they encounter computer related problem. Most of the 
officers would contact IT support when faced with a problem as can be seen in 
Figure 9. 
0
1
2
3
4
Office AMOS Operating
system
NAPA Payroll &
billing
software
Course for
using
programs
more
efficiently
Ship's
reporting
program
I feel that I need more training in following 
subject(s)
34 
 
  
Figure 9. Results of who to contact in case of computer problems 
 
The officers were allowed to answer freely, so some answered that first they 
would ask their colleague or superior and then would contact IT support. This 
is a good practice since it will not trouble the support unnecessarily as there is 
a chance that answer can be found just by asking someone else. There is also 
possibility that the vessel is at open sea so the internet connection is very 
limited making remote access challenging. The rest of the questions 
concerning officers’ IT skills can be seen in Figure 10. 
  
Figure 10. Results of IT skills questions 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
IT-support Colleague Superior
Who do you contact when you encouter 
computer related problem?
10
12
7
15
11
13
17
7
5
10
2
6
4
0
0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 100 %
Have you ever configured a firewall?
Have you ever used any of the following tools: device
manager, disk management, Regedit?
Do you use cloud saving?
Have you seen inside computer casing or do you
otherwise know computer's structure?
Have you ever installed an operating system?
Do you know where to find computer's IP address?
Do you feel like you manage your every day workload
with your IT skills?
IT skills
Yes No
35 
 
It is great to see that everyone thought they can manage their computer 
related duties. In their own mind, their background training and onboard 
familiarization are enough to cope with their tasks. 
Majority of the officers knew where to look computer’s IP address. This is a 
good skill to know when solving the internet problems. Sometimes it is enough 
to reset IP address and other times IT support may ask the user to tell them 
the IP address.  
Although it is not necessary to know how to install an operating system, it is 
good to know what happens during installation. This can be counted amongst 
nice to know skills to make everyday duties a little easier as you have some 
basic understanding what is happening in the background. Keeping this in 
mind, it was good to find out that two thirds of the officers had installed an 
operating system. 
Almost everyone knew from what components computer consists of. However, 
this is not essential information as it is rather rare that one should open a 
computer and change a component. Usually, when a computer breaks down,  
IT support comes to replace it with a new unit so even they will not replace 
single components.  
It was rather disappointing to find out that less than half of the officers used 
cloud saving on their personal files. As it is quite easy way to make backups of 
one’s files and to ensure that they are available when one is on the road, it 
would be desirable that more people would use cloud saving. 
It was positively surprising when twelve officers answered having used 
Windows’ advanced tools. Those are great help when solving problems 
concerning external devices and other problems. Regedit is the rarest of these 
tools and some officers did not know what it is. 
The number of officers that had configured a firewall was also positively 
surprising. When they were asked to specify what they had done, they 
answered that they had opened ports for programs. Therefore, it would be 
safe to presume that they have been dealing with either Windows’ or router’s 
firewall settings but in my opinion this is good enough. 
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5.3 Security awareness 
Security awareness is the most important part of this survey.  Here it is found 
out whether the officers know to avoid cyber threats in their everyday 
practices. The results can be seen in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Results of security awareness questions 
 
Most of the officers were aware that smartphones and tablets are vulnerable 
to threats. This is good since there might rise a need to plug your phone or 
tablet to ship’s computer to transfer files. This, for example, is one of the most 
probable ways to infect ship’s computer, therefore they should be aware of 
that. 
The same goes for plugging your personal USB stick to the ship’s computers. 
It is quite worrisome to see that over half of the officers thought that it is fine to 
plug in one’s USB stick. Some of them claimed that it is acceptable because 
the computer’s antivirus software scans the stick each time it is plugged in. No 
effective defenses from USB attacks are known. Malware scanners cannot 
access the firmware running on USB devices. Behavioral detection is difficult 
since behavior of an infected device may look as though a user has simply 
plugged in a new device. Blocking or allowing specific USB device classes 
and device IDs is possible, however generic lists can easily be bypassed. Pre-
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boot attacks may be prevented by use of a BIOS password and booting only 
to the hard drive (Security Research Labs 2014). Keeping that in mind one 
should be always aware what they are doing when plugging in a USB device. 
It is good to see that no one would open files sent by an unknown sender. 
This is one of the most probable ways to infect computer as it is used on many 
types of attacks such as phishing. 
Two thirds of the officers had backups of their own files.  Although this is not 
actually an IT skill, it gives an overview of that person’s skills and attitudes. 
Also, two thirds of the officers said that they scan downloaded files for viruses 
before opening them. Although this is not necessary if one is sure that the file 
does not contain any malicious software, it is always better to be safe than 
sorry. 
When asked if antivirus software gave protection from all threats, the results 
were not that good. Two persons claimed that it would protect from everything 
and five persons were not sure. Everyone should be aware that there is 
always a way around antivirus software. 
All but one had antivirus software installed on their computer. Some even 
added that they had antivirus software also on their tablets and smart phones. 
The one person who did not have AV software said that he had a Mac and 
claimed that Macs do not get viruses. This might have been true some years 
ago, but the situation has changed. Bogdan Botezatu, a Senior E-Threat 
Analyst from Bitdefender, says Macs can definitely be infected by viruses. 
Mac OS X software has more high-risk vulnerabilities than all versions of 
Windows put together. Apple markets these products as virus-free. They say 
you do not need an antivirus, because they know people hate antivirus 
software. These utilities often slow down your computer, so they do not want 
to promote them (Hill 2015). 
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It was good to see that everyone had at least two passwords as can be seen 
in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. Results of number of passwords 
 
Even better, most of the officers said that they have more than three different 
passwords in use. It is important to have multiple passwords, as if one of them 
is compromised then not all the services one uses are threatened. 
To find out how strong the officers passwords are they were asked how many 
different attributes their passwords had as can be seen in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Results of quality of passwords 
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Most of the officers said that their passwords included two attributes. If one 
had to speculate, it would seem that these would be small and capital letters 
and numbers. The complexity of password is important but the length of the 
password is even more important as it makes the amount of possibilities to 
grow exponentially. The randomness of the password is also an important 
factor. It is much easier to guess the password if it consists of dictionary 
words.  
The result of virus scan frequency was rather divided, as can be seen in 
Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Results of frequency of virus scans 
 
Seven said that they scan at least once in two weeks. Some added that their 
AV software is set to scan automatically every week. This is a good thing as it 
reveals possible infection quite early and does not require any actions from 
the user. On the other hand, it was terribly disappointing as five answered that 
they do not scan their computer even once in three months. This makes 
possible infection even worse as it will not be discovered for a long time.  
To summarize this survey, the results were better than initially expected. 
However, there is still room for improvement. Even though everyone said that 
they can cope with their daily duties, there are things that they should be more 
aware.  
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It is not realistic to expect every vessel to have access to IT and cybersecurity 
expertise; however, most people today have some level of IT knowledge and 
security awareness through using their private computers (Hansen &Rahman 
2013, 4). This will be addressed more profoundly in the next chapter. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Network 
Firstly, it must be admitted that the descriptions of the studied vessels’ 
networks are incomplete as I was unable to study how switches and firewalls 
are configured. This would be crucial information in determining the complete 
integrity and security of the network. However, some conclusions can be 
drawn from what is known. 
As both shipping companies had proper IT departments, it is rather safe to 
assume that firewalls and switches are configured properly, both ship A and B 
have secure networks. However, even in this case network A is more 
vulnerable as computers are not separated in any way.  The weak point is the 
leisure computers. As crew members use these computers for their personal 
affairs there is always a risk for infecting the whole network. With this in mind, 
network B is more secure as it allows crew members to use their own 
computers through a separate VLAN and therefore keeping them apart from 
vessel’s computers. 
This subject should be studied further. It was agreed with my supervisor that 
the best course of action would be to offer a shipping company an evaluation 
of their network. In this way, it would be possible to gain a complete access to 
the network and devices. The evaluation should be done in co-operation 
between an IT and a marine student. Co-operation between two students 
would be essential in order to get proper understanding of the network and its 
vulnerabilities and what could be caused to navigation and other systems. The 
shipping company would also benefit from this arrangement as they would 
gain valuable information (Kettunen 2017). 
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Even though the studied networks can be considered secure there is always 
room for improvement. One solution could be to use a firewall to zone devices 
from each other with different purposes. An example can be seen in Figure 
15.
 
Figure 15 Improved network 
 
In this case the logical nexus of the network would be a next-generation 
firewall. The clouds in the figure present different zones. This allows 
administrators to set up policies for different zones that are: leisure computers, 
workstations, server and ECDIS. This way it is possible to deny all access 
from leisure zone to all other zones. In case some computer in leisure zone 
gets infected it will not be able to spread to other zones (Kettunen 2017).  
ECDIS would be allowed to connect to manufacturer’s server to download 
updates but all other traffic would be denied. This way both remote side and 
client side threats are minimized. I am personally against connecting ECDIS to 
the internet as I feel threats are greater than benefits. This is because the only 
explicit benefit from connecting ECDIS to the internet is to make updating 
easier. However, this will increase the possibility of infection far greater. If 
ECDIS is connected to the internet it should at least have an AV software and 
possibly even software based firewall installed. I know this would increase the 
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costs as one would have to buy the software and ECDIS should have better 
hardware than mentioned back in Table 1 but as even the most basic ECDIS 
will cost over ten thousand euros the cost increase would be meaningless in 
the long run. 
Workstations and server would be able to communicate between each other. 
However, both zones would be allowed to use applications that are essential 
for working. A possible VPN connection to company’s office would be possible 
in this network. 
 
6.2 Training 
Even though the results of the survey were better than my initial expectations, 
there is still a lot of room for improvement. The worst part was the number of 
officers who though that plugging one’s own USB stick the vessel’s systems is 
acceptable. This is one of the most probable ways of infecting systems.  
The number of different passwords and their complexity was also promising. 
Passwords that are easy to guess can also compromise even the most 
protected system. It was good to see that none had passwords that only 
contained small letters so there is some level of complexity involved. 
However, it was not one or two cases where the password for some account 
was written on a paper that was there for everyone to read. Even though 
gaining physical access to a ship is difficult, it is not a good practice to keep 
passwords at a visible location. 
Overall, officers’ IT skills seemed to be in good order when taking into 
consideration that they do not get that much training for IT. Some officers had 
even taken some advanced courses on their own and others had learned to 
use Windows tools by themselves. 
There is no cybersecurity related subject taught at Finnish maritime schools 
nor the shipping companies seem to organize cybersecurity courses for their 
personnel. Therefore, seafarer’s cybersecurity awareness comes from his or 
her personal interest and experience. This has to change. It would not take 
too much resources for schools to arrange an eight-hour awareness course. 
For example, the contents of the course could be the following: 
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 Risks related to emails and how to behave in a safe manner. Examples are 
phishing attacks where the user clicks on a link to a malicious site; 
 
 Risks related to the internet usage, including social media, chat forums 
and cloud-based file storage where data movement is less controlled and 
monitored; 
 
  Risks related to the use of own devices. These devices may be missing 
security patches and controls, such as anti-virus, and may transfer the risk 
to the environment to which they are connected; 
 
  Risks related to installing and maintaining software on company hardware, 
where the infection can be propagated, starting from infected hardware 
(removable media) or software (infected package); 
 
 Risks related to poor software and data security practices where no anti-
virus checks or authenticity verifications are performed; 
 
 Safeguarding user information, passwords and digital certificates; 
 
 Cyber risks in relation to the physical presence of non-company personnel, 
eg, where third-party technicians are left to work on equipment without 
supervision; 
 
 Detecting suspicious activity and how to report if a possible cyber incident 
is in progress. Examples of this are strange connections that are not 
normally seen or someone plugging in an unknown device on the ship 
network; 
 
 Awareness of the consequences or impact of cyber incidents to the safety 
and operations of the ship; 
 
 Understanding how to implement preventative maintenance routines such 
as anti-virus and anti-malware, patching, backups, and incidence-response 
planning and testing; and 
 
 Procedures for protecting against service providers’ removable media 
before they are allowed to be connected to the ship’s systems. 
 
In addition, seafarers need to be made aware that the presence of anti-
malware software does not remove the requirement for robust security 
procedures, for example controlling the use of all removable media  
(BIMCO 2016, 15). 
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These are basic topics that could be used to make sure that each seafarer’s 
daily actions are secure. Graduated seafarers should undergo a similar 
training. 
I think cybersecurity training should be a made a certificate course but not a 
certificate of proficiency. Technology and especially security aspects develop 
and change rapidly so in order to have up to date knowledge the course 
should be renewed every five years as it is with many other maritime courses. 
I hope that some sort of mention of cybersecurity training makes its way to the 
next edition of STCW. There are many reports and studies, some of which are 
mentioned in this thesis, that state the importance of cybersecurity awareness 
for seafarers. There are some vague guidelines but concrete actions are 
missing. 
 
6.3 IT Officer 
No crew member was responsible for onboard IT systems on the studied 
vessels. This has been the same on other vessels I have been on. It has 
always been the responsibility of the IT department whether it is company’s 
own or a third-party department. This sort of arrangement is fine if the vessel 
has short voyages and the the internet connection is reliable. This seems to 
be the case with many Finnish flagged vessels as they rarely journey beyond 
the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. But even in this kind of scenario it is 
devastating if some crucial system would crash and couldn’t be fixed as there 
is no person on board capable of repairing the system.  
The concept of having an IT responsible officer, whether from deck or engine 
department, is an interesting one as there is no such person on merchant 
vessels. The only one who comes to close to this is the electro-technical 
officer. However, they are only required to have understanding of the vessel’s 
computer network, not proficiency to work on it. Electro-technical rating has no 
requirements regarding computer networks (STCW 2011, 172). It would solve 
several challenges and would lighten the reliability from the IT department. 
However, there are few problems with this concept. As many vessels are 
sailing with skeleton crew, officers have their hands full with their current 
duties. In my opinion, having an IT officer would require vessel to have at least 
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three officers, excluding the chief officer. Adding a role as significant as this 
would overload the responsible officer otherwise. IT officer would require 
extensive amount of training in order to cope with IT duties. They would need 
to have knowledge of computers and network devices and how to diagnose 
errors and to fix them.  
Lloyd’s register has something like this in their mind as they say the following 
in their guide: The jobs of seafarers and shore staff need to be re-designed to 
take account of new or changed responsibilities, including support and 
maintenance of software-intensive systems (Lloyd’s Register 2016, 5). My 
interpretation is that this does not directly point to creating an IT officer but to 
modify current duties of officers.  
The following is purely my own concept of a Deck IT Officer: 
 The officer would be educated according to STCW A-II/1. 
 In addition, they would take IT courses worth of 30 credits including 
subjects such as computer technology, network technology and 
cybersecurity. 
 Onboard a vessel, they would work as a watchkeeping officer 
 They would be responsible for keeping the vessel’s IT systems up to date 
and diagnose faulty devices and try to repair them. They would do this in 
co-operation with the IT department if possible. 
 In order to keep responsibilities clear, they would not be responsible for 
keeping ECDIS as a software up to date, this would still be the navigation 
officer’s duty. 
 They would be responsible for the radio equipment. 
 In addition, they would have less frequent duties such as keeping 
cybersecurity training for the crew, assisting security officer with 
cybersecurity aspects, planning IT operations with the IT department.
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Appendix 1/1 
SURVEY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS POSSIBILITIES 
Question Answer 
How would you evaluate your own IT-skills? Bad/Moderate/Good/Excellent 
Do you feel like you manage your every day workload with your 
IT-skills? 
Yes/No/Not sure 
Do you feel like you need more training for using computer 
programs? 
Yes/No/Not sure 
If yes, which? Free 
Who do you contact when you encouter computer related 
problem? 
Free 
Do you use cloud saving? Yes/No/Not sure 
Have you seen inside computer casing or do you otherwise 
know computer's structure? 
Yes/No/Not sure 
Have you ever installed an operating system? Yes/No/Not sure 
Do you know where to find computer's IP-address? Yes/No/Not sure 
Have you ever used any of the following tools: device manager, 
disk management, Regedit? 
Yes/No/Not sure 
Do you have an IT-related degree? Yes/No 
If yes, which? Free 
Have you been in IT-related courses? Yes/No 
If yes, which? Free 
Do you have virus protection installed on your personal 
computer? 
Yes/No/Not sure 
Does anti-virus software give protection from all threats? Yes/No/Not sure 
How often do you scan your computer for viruses? 
Once in 2 weeks/Once a 
month/Once in 3 months/less 
frequently 
Do you scan downloaded files for viruses before opening them? Yes/No/Not sure 
 
 
 
Appendix 1/2 
Does your password include following: small and capital letters, 
numbers, special signs? 
1/2/All 
Do you have backups of your own files? Yes/No/Not sure 
Is it safe to plug your own usb-stick to ship's computers? Yes/No/Not sure 
Do you open attached files in messages from unknown sender? Yes/No/Not sure 
How many different passwords do you have in your personal 
use? 
1/2/3/More 
Do you take action if password have leaked from services you 
use? 
Yes/No/Not sure 
Are smartphones and tables safe from viruses and malware? Yes/No/Not sure 
Have you ever configured a firewall? Yes/No/Not sure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
CONSILIUM ECDIS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
